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This paper analyzes the self-selection patterns among Mexican return migrants 
during the period from 1990 to 2010. Using census data, we can identify return 
migrants who have lived in the United States within the previous 5 years but who 
currently live in Mexico. To calculate the selection patterns, we nonparametrically 
estimate the counterfactual wages that the return migrants would have experienced 
had they never migrated by using the wage structure of nonmigrants. We find 
evidence that the selection patterns change over time toward negative selection. 
For example, in 1990, the wages that the male return migrants would have 
experienced had they not migrated was 6 percent larger than the wages of male 
nonmigrants. However, by 2010, the difference had declined to -14 percent. The 
increasing negativity of the degree of selection is robust to the analysis of specific 
subgroups: rural and urban, men and women, and states with high migration rates 
and low migration rates. Moreover, the negative selection results for the period 
from 2000 to 2010 are robust to the use of different surveys that define a return 
migrant by using distinct characteristics. Additionally, we observe that the wages 
of return migrants are larger than those that the migrants would have obtained had 
they not migrated. This finding shows that migration has a positive effect on the 
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1  Introduction 
 
International migration is not always a permanent decision. Some migrants return to 
their countries of origin after staying for a period of time in the country of destination. 
Return migrants may bring skills or capital to the home economy and thereby contribute to 
the positive effects of migration in the source countries. Mexico has become the largest 
source of immigrants in the United States. Mexican immigrants accounted for 31.3 percent 
of the new arrivals in the 1990s (Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005). Their return migration rate is 
also high. The 2010 Mexican census shows that of the 994,869 individuals who left their 
country to live in the United States from 2005 to 2010, 307,783 returned to Mexico by 
2010. In other words, 30.9 percent of the migrants returned home.
1 In this article, we 
investigate the self-selection patterns among the return migrants in Mexico. 
Policymakers around the world are engaged in a broad debate on the implications of 
immigration and the optimal migration policy. One of the requirements for an informed 
discussion is accurately determining the skills of the migrant population. Unfortunately, no 
consensus exists regarding the self-selection patterns of Mexican immigrants. Chiquiar and 
Hanson (2005) conclude that Mexican immigrants are located in the middle of the Mexican 
wage distribution by using the Mexican and U.S. census data from 1990 and 2000. In 
contrast, Fernandez-Huertas (2011) uses the labor force survey for the period from 2000 to 
2004. This dataset collects information on the migrants from Mexico before the individuals 
migrate. He finds strong evidence of negative selection in the fact that migrant wages are 
less than 20 percent of the earnings of the rest of the Mexican population. 
Within the wide range of issues that have been examined by the recent literature on 
migration, we focus on two important questions regarding Mexican return migrants: 1) Are 
Mexican return migrants positively or negatively selected? 2) Do return migrants improve 
their productivity in the labor market of the source economy compared with their 
productivity had they not migrated? Given the scant empirical evidence regarding the return 
migration of Mexican migrants, our paper contributes to the understanding of the 
self-selection patterns among these migrants. The second question has implications for the 
                                                       
1  Other data sources provide similar results. The National Survey of Demographic Dynamics 2006 
(ENADID) presents a return migration rate of 33.72 percent in 2006 for those who left the country within the 
previous 5 years. 2 
 
analysis of labor market effects on the economy of the source country. The high proportion 
of return migration among Mexican migrants in the U.S. suggests that the economic effects 
of return migration could be large. If the migrants acquire some skills as a result of their 
migration, then return migration has a positive effect on the source economy. 
Only a few recent articles have used data on return migrants in the Mexican labor 
market. Lacuesta (2006) uses the wages of return migrants to calculate the wages that the 
migrants remaining in the United States would have obtained in Mexico. The information is 
from the 2000 census in Mexico and the United States. He shows that immigrants who stay 
in the United States come from the middle part of the distribution of human capital. 
However, his paper focuses on comparisons between return migrants and nonreturning 
migrants.  
Gitter et al. (2008) analyze the effect of return migration on the probability of 
employment by using the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), which was conducted in 
2002. They focus on return migrants who have been in the United States between 1997 and 
2002. The researchers’ results indicate that migration does not affect the probability of 
employment. Unfortunately, their paper does not address counterfactual wage distributions.   
Ambrosini and Peri (2011) use the 2002 and 2005 rounds of MxFLS and define 
return migrants as workers who lived in Mexico in 2005 and have spent more than one year 
in the US between 2002 and 2005. Because of the sample size and the short time period, the 
number of return migrants identified is small (i.e., only 56). Thus, making strong inferences 
is difficult. However, the scholars find evidence that spending some time in the US 
enhances one’s earning abilities and accounts for some mildly positive selection among the 
return migrants. The data from the Mexican census used in our estimates present an 
adequate sample of return migrants and allow us to observe changes over longer periods of 
time. However, the census does not include all of the variables that can be found in the 
MxFLS or the panel structure. 
To determine the self-selection patterns, we calculate the counterfactual wage 
distributions of the return migrants had they stayed in Mexico. To calculate this 
counterfactual wage, we follow DiNardo et al.’s (1996) method and reweight the wage 
distributions of the nonmigrants such that the distribution of observable characteristics 
between the return migrants and the nonmigrants is as similar as possible. We use the 1990, 3 
 
2000 and 2010 population censuses and focus on males and females separately. Using the 
census, we can identify individuals who have been in the United States within the previous 
5 years. However, restricting the time frame to a short migration period may bias the 
results. Hence, we use different data sources that also include migration information to 
verify the sensitivity of our results. 
The self-selection patterns among return migrants have changed over time. In 1990, 
the selection was slightly positive for both men and women. In 2000, the selection among 
the women stayed positive, but the men were drawn more from the middle of the wage 
distribution. The result changed in 2010. The selection among the men became negative, 
and the women were drawn more from the middle of the distribution, with negative 
selection on average. For example, in 1990, the wages that male return migrants would 
have experienced had they not migrated were 6 percent larger than the wages of nonmigrant 
males, but by 2010, this difference had declined to -14 percent. Moreover, migration allows 
those who return to obtain higher wages because the increase in human capital or savings 
can be applied to productive activities. In other words, there is a wage premium associated 
with migration and return. In 1990, the wage premiums for the men and women were 36 
and 38 percent, respectively, whereas in 2010, the wage premiums were 5 and 7 percent, 
respectively. As in the case of selection, the wage premiums to migrate and return have 
worsened over time for both men and women.   
When we analyze the geographical subgroups, we find that the self-selection 
patterns differ, but we find a tendency toward negative selection among every subgroup as 
time moves forward. Among the rural population, we observe positive selection patterns. 
However, among the urban population, the selection becomes less positive or even 
negative. If we divide the Mexican states between those that have historically shown a high 
migration rate and the rest of the country, we find that the degree of negative selection is 
higher in states with high migration rates but that the tendency toward negative selection is 
present in both groups. 
To confront any concerns about our estimates, we perform different robustness 
tests. The results vary little when we restrict our sample to only the working population or 
young individuals. By using additional datasets that define return migrant differently from 
the census, we find results consistent with those of our basic specifications, except when we 4 
 
concentrate on the short-term flow of return migrants. Here, the degree of selection is more 
negative, possibly because low-skilled individuals tend to do make more than one trip. In 
sum, we find robust evidence that the self-selection patterns among the current return 
migrants are negative. 
According to Bratsberg and Borjas’s (1996) model, in countries such as Mexico, 
where payments to human capital are more unequal than those in the United States, return 
migrants should be selected negatively with respect to the nonmigrant population. This 
hypothesis only holds clearly for the men in 2010 and is clearly rejected for the 1990 
census. Our results are more consistent with the observation that low-skilled individuals 
may face costs that prevent them from migrating in the first place. The fact that the 
selection tends to become negative over time supports the hypothesis that migration 
networks may relax the costs faced by low-skilled individuals, as suggested by McKenzie 
and Rapoport (2010). However, further research is necessary to establish whether other 
factors, such as the enforcement of immigration laws or changes in the demand for 
immigrants, explain the change in the degree of selection among return migrants. 
In the next section, we review the literature on selection and examine how return 
migration is related to selection and productivity improvements. Section 3 explains the 
identification strategy. Section 4 provides more details about Mexican return migration and 
describes the datasets employed in this study. In section 5, we discuss the results. Finally, 
in section 6, we conclude this paper. 
 
2    Selection and Return Migration 
 
Immigrants are not necessarily a representative sample of the population in the 
sending countries. Incentives to migrate differ among the various groups of the population 
depending on their observable and unobservable characteristics. Several authors have 
attempted to model the selection patterns of international migration. 
On the one hand, Chiswick (1999) develops a model showing that immigrants are 
positively selected. On the other hand, Borjas (1987) shows that immigrants are selected 
from groups with lower qualifications when the returns to skills are more dispersed in the 
sending countries compared with the dispersion in the destination economies. In contrast, 5 
 
immigrants tend to possess higher qualifications when the returns to skills in source 
economies are more egalitarian compared with the returns to skills in destination 
economies. Comparing theoretical predictions with US data, Borjas (1987) shows that 
positive selection is much more likely among immigrants from advanced countries, where 
the returns to skills are lower, whereas negative selection is more likely among developing 
countries, where the returns to skills are more unequal. Then, negative selection is expected 
for a country such as Mexico. A surge in empirical research has attempted to corroborate 
this claim.
2  
Previous studies regarding the case of Mexico have obtained mixed results. Using 
the US and Mexican population censuses of 1990 and 2000, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) 
find evidence that Mexican immigrants in the US tend to be located in the middle of the 
wage distribution in Mexico. Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) developed a similar model and 
found empirical evidence consistent with Chiquiar and Hanson’s (2005) results by using 
data from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP). 
However, the US census may provide an incomplete picture of Mexican migrants.
3 
Ibarraran and Lubotsky (2007) used the 2000 Mexican census to estimate the level of 
education of the Mexican migrants from 1995 to 2000. The researchers found that the 
Mexican migrants in the US are less educated by half a year than the remaining population 
in Mexico. The researchers argue that the missing migrants in the Mexican census (i.e., 
those who traveled with their entire families) cannot reverse the result of negative selection. 
Fernandez-Huertas (2011) also challenges the empirical findings of intermediate 
selection. He uses the Labor Force Survey (ENE, a quarterly survey similar to the CPS in 
the US) from 2000 to 2004. In ENE, one can identify a Mexican emigrant to the United 
States before and after his or her departure. However, one can only identify short-term 
departures because ENE follows households for 5 consecutive quarters. Using the wages of 
these individuals before they migrate, Fernandez-Huertas (2011) finds that Mexican male 
                                                       
2  Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), Fernandez-Huertas (2011), Ibarraran and Lubotsky (2007), Kaestner and 
Malamud (2010), Lacuesta (2006),McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) and Orrenius and Zavodny (2005). 
However, see also Grogger and Hanson (2011) for a model in which absolute wage differences, not relative 
differences, are the main determinant of migration. 
3  Ibarraran and Lubotsky (2007) point out that the migrants in the US census often overreport their education 
levels, possibly because of failures in translation or their inappropriate understanding of the survey options. 
Additionally, the researchers show that the US census underestimates the size of the illegal population, which 
is generally composed of low-skilled workers. 6 
 
immigrants from 2000 to 2004 earn lower wages and have less education than individuals 
who remain in Mexico. This finding provides evidence of negative selection. 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) point out that migration networks can partially 
reconcile some of the conflicting findings in the literature. They show that access to 
migration networks can theoretically alleviate some of the migration costs, with low-skilled 
migrants experiencing the greatest benefits. Hence, the researchers’ model predicts positive 
self-selection in communities with weak migration networks and negative self-selection in 
communities with strong migration networks. Using the Encuesta Nacional de la Dinamica 
Demografica 1997 (ENADID), McKenzie and Rapoport find that their theoretical 
prediction holds for males between 15 and 49 years old in areas with populations less than 
100,000 people. The probability of migration increases with education in communities with 
weak migrant networks and decreases with education in communities with strong migrant 
networks.  
Recent papers have not reported consistent results. On the one hand, Kaestner and 
Malamud (2010) use the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) to find that male Mexican 
migrants are selected from the middle of the observed skill distribution. However, when the 
researchers control for migration costs, the evidence of intermediate selection diminishes. 
They also point out that no relationship exists between immigrant status and the distribution 
of the unexplained component of wages. On the other hand, Ambrosini and Peri (2011) use 
the same data source to find evidence of negative selection that is similar to the evidence 
found by Fernandez-Huertas (2011). Future research must explain why the same data 
source produces such different results. 
These scholars have obtained their results while paying little or no attention to the 
following fact: an important proportion of migrants do not permanently reside in the 
country of destination. Bratsberg and Borjas (1996) developed theoretical implications of 
these migrants’ existence. In their model, two types of individuals decide to return after 
migration: 1) individuals whose decisions to temporarily migrate are due to optimal 
decisions within their life cycles, and 2) individuals who return once they discover that 
their incomes in the country of destination are sufficiently worse than predicted. The model 
shows that return migration as an optimal life cycle decision occurs when the migrants 
discover that their returns to skills in their countries of origin are larger than those the 7 
 
migrants would have obtained had they not moved temporarily.
4  
Bratsberg and Borjas (1996) also show that return migration accentuates the 
selection type in the original flow. If the original flow is characterized by low-skilled 
individuals, then the high-skilled migrants will have incentives to return, which accentuates 
the negative selection among the remaining migrants in the destination economy. If the 
original flow is characterized by high-skilled individuals, then the low-skilled migrants will 
have incentives to return, which accentuates the positive selection. 
Within this theoretical framework, Coulon and Piracha (2005) analyze the migrants 
who have returned to Albania by using information from the source country. The 
researchers show that the decision to migrate may temporarily be an optimal decision 
because the wages are greater than what they would have been had the return migrants 
decided to permanently stay in Albania. With respect to the type of selection, the migrants 
who returned exhibited negative selection whereas those who never migrated would have 
gained higher wages had they been paid with the same returns to skills that the returning 
migrants received. Rooth and Sarela (2007) concentrate on Finnish immigrants in Sweden. 
Finland and Sweden have free mobility of labor between themselves. The returns to 
observable skills are higher in Finland than in Sweden. The researchers obtain the result 
predicted by the Bratsberg and Borjas model (i.e., negative selection) by using the data 
regarding the performances of returning migrants in the Finnish market. 
The possibility of improving skills is not the only reason that the literature has 
explored to explain return migration. Dustmann (2003) shows that parents’ concerns about 
their children can increase return migration. Dustmann and Weiss (2007) constructed a 
theoretical model in which higher preferences for consumption in the home country or high 
purchasing power of the host country’s currency in the migrants’ home country could lead 
to return migration. Gibson and McKenzie’s (2011) empirical evidence for a group of 
highly skilled migrants shows that the decision to return is strongly linked to family and 
lifestyle reasons rather than to the income opportunities in different countries. Determining 
the importance of these explanations for return migration among Mexicans is beyond the 
                                                       
4  Other models have similar implications. Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) construct a model in which 
return migration is also related to increases in wages after the migrants’ return. Their model shows how the 
existence of different activities after the migrants’ return can lead to different optimal time periods for the 
migration process. 8 
 
scope of our article. 
For the case of Mexico, only Lacuesta (2006) and Ambrosini and Peri (2011) have 
investigated the type of selection among return migrants. We discussed the differences and 
advantages of our approach earlier. We use information from Mexican censuses to show 
that the degree of selection among return migrants has changed over time (i.e., from 
positive selection in 1990 to negative selection in 2010). Additionally, our results indicate 
that the increase in wages produced by migration has decreased. The changes in selection 
are consistent with a decline in costs produced by migrant networks, as proposed by 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2010).   
 
3  Empirical  Strategy 
 
Most of the Mexican immigrant studies on self-selection patterns have attempted to 
assess the robustness of Chiquiar and Hanson’s (2005) finding of intermediate selection. To 
compare our results with those obtained in that article, we also construct counterfactual 
densities of wages, which is a methodology originally developed by DiNardo, Fortin and 
Lemiux (1996). This methodology also allows us to compare the results with those 
obtained by Fernandez-Huertas (2011), whose study reports the highest degree of negative 
selection in the literature. 
 
3.1  Counterfactual  densities 
 
We aim to calculate the distribution of the wages that return migrants would have 
obtained had they never migrated. We can do so by combining the wage structure of 
nonmigrants with the observable characteristics of the return migrant population. Then we 
compare this counterfactual distribution with the observed distribution of the nonmigrants’ 
earnings to establish the type of selection among the return migrants. We refer to w as 
wages, z as the observed characteristics of the individual in domain ,  ݂௦ as the density 
function of the nonmigrants (s denotes stayers), ݂௠ as the density function of the return 
migrants, and ݂ ௠
௦ as the counterfactual density function of the wages that the return 
migrants would have earned had they never migrated. We define I as an indicator of 9 
 
whether the individual is a stayer (s) or a return migrant (m). 
The wage distribution for the nonmigrants is   
 
  dz s I z f z w f w f
s
z
s ) = | ( ) | ( = ) (     (1) 
 
and the wage distribution for the return migrants is 
 
  dz m I z f z w f w f
m
z
m ) = | ( ) | ( = ) (     (2) 
 
The counterfactual distribution of the wages that the return migrants would have 
experienced had they been paid according to the wage structure of the nonmigrants is 
 




m ) = | ( ) | ( = ) (     (3) 
 
This expression represents the counterfactual density of the return migrants had they 
never migrated. We assume that the wage density function does not depend on the 
distribution of characteristics z. Therefore, we can use the characteristics of the return 
migrant population and integrate them over z in the function for the wage distribution of the 
nonmigrants. Instead of integrating, DiNardo, Fortin and Lemiux (1996) propose modifying 
equation (3) as follows: 
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where 
) = | (
) = | (
= ) (
s I z f
m I z f
z  . Hence, we only need to know  ) (z   and reweight the wage 
distribution for the nonmigrants to obtain the counterfactual distribution of the wages that 
the return migrants would have obtained had they never migrated. Using Bayes' Rule, the 
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The reweighting function  ) (z    assigns higher weights to nonmigrants with values 
of z close to the characteristics of the return migrants and lower values to individuals with 
characteristics that are not so close to those of the return migrants. Thus, the reweighted 
population has values of z similar to those of the return migrants. 
A possible bias in the methodology lies in the role of unobservable characteristics. 
For example, if the return migrants tend to have greater motivation, then our methodology 
will assign excessively low counterfactual wages. Conversely, if the migrants tend to be 
less motivated, then we will give them excessively high counterfactual wages. In a recent 
article, Kaestner and Malamud (2010) showed that there is little evidence of selection in the 
unobservables between migrants and nonmigrants in Mexico. This finding suggests that the 
potential bias caused by variables outside the vector z is small. Nevertheless, in the 
robustness test section, we implement a flexible estimation procedure by using different 
observable characteristics of z. 
To estimate the weight  ) (z  , we notice that  ) = ( s I f  and  ) = ( m I f  are the 
proportions of the nonmigrants and the return migrants in the population. The other two 
elements,  ) | = ( z s I f  and  ) | = ( z m I f , are the conditional probabilities of being a 
nonmigrant (s) or a return migrant (m). We can easily estimate the conditional probabilities 
from the pooled population by using probit or logit conditioning on the set of 
characteristics z. After obtaining  ) (z  , we introduce it into the wage distributions for the 
nonmigrants, as in equation (4), to calculate the counterfactual wage distribution of the 
return migrants. We calculate the wage distributions by using nonparametric distributions. 
Following Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) and Fernandez-Huertas (2011), we focus on 
the distribution of the wages that the return migrants would have obtained had they not 
migrated  ) (w f
s
m . After obtaining this counterfactual distribution, we compare it with the 
wage distribution of the nonmigrants and obtain the type of selection. In other words, we 
nonparametrically characterize the wage distributions to obtain the following: 
 11 
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A positive difference indicates that a greater proportion of the migrants returned 
rather than stayed at the given level of wages. If the difference is negative, then the 
proportion of return migrants is lower. For negative selection, we must note a positive 
difference in low wages and a negative difference in high wages. However, if the selection 
is positive, then we must observe a negative difference in low wages and a positive 
difference in high wages. 
An alternative way to characterize the counterfactual distribution of wages is to 
simply use the new factor  ) (z    to compute the reweighted statistics in the distribution of 
the nonmigrants. These new statistics characterize the distribution of the wages that the 
return migrants would have obtained had they not migrated. We can compare these wages 
by utilizing the statistics arising from the observed distribution of the nonmigrants to 
determine the differences. We can calculate the standard errors of the statistics by 
bootstrapping the procedure. 
The described methodology considers the full population of return migrants and 
nonmigrants regardless of whether the individuals work. However, the manner in which the 
characteristics in vector z affect the rate of labor market participation can differ between the 
return migrants and the nonmigrants. To eliminate any differences that might arise because 
of different labor market participation rates, in the robustness test section, we estimate the 
model by restricting the sample to only the individuals who are working and show that this 
procedure does not affect the main estimates. 
 
4    Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
We use the Mexican Population Census for the years 1990, 2000 and 2010. One can 
obtain these data from the website of the National Institute of Statistics in Mexico.
5 The 
census includes a question about the place of residence 5 years before the survey takes 
place. Additionally, in the 2000 and 2010 censuses, we can identify the individuals who 
                                                       
5  The 10 percent samples are available through the INEGI website (http://www.inegi.org.mx).  12 
 
have migrated within the 5 years preceding the census but then returned during that period. 
We use these questions to identify the return migrants. 
Two different types of people qualify as return migrants from the United States. 
First, we include individuals born in Mexico who lived in the United States 5 years prior to 
the census and resided in Mexico when the Census took place. Second, we include 
individuals born in Mexico who lived in Mexico 5 years prior to the census but migrated to 
the United States during that period and resided in Mexico when the census information 
was collected. 
We restrict our sample to the individuals born in Mexico who were between 20 and 
59 years old.
6 Unfortunately, the census does not allow us to identify international 
migratory activities beyond the 5 years prior to the census’s survey date. Hence, individuals 
who may have migrated before that period are considered as nonmigrants by design. 
However, to counteract this possible bias, we use other data sources that do not restrict the 
time period of the return migration to verify the sensitivity of this result, as explained 
below. 
In addition to the information about migration, the census includes important 
socio-demographic data. We use the following variables: sex, education, age, indigenous 
membership, income from employment, hours worked, type of activity, unemployment, 
geographical location and marital status. 
To estimate the wage distribution, we only use individuals who reported a positive 
hourly wage.
7 However, it is important to emphasize that the reweighting procedure uses 
the full population of return migrants and nonmigrants, not just the working population. 
Additionally, we consider the individuals who reported more than 100 hours worked to 
have earned an invalid wage. Later, we analyze the sensitivity of our results by considering 
the differences in the participation rates between the return migrants and the nonmigrants. 
 
                                                       
6  The 1990 census recorded 3,433,584 nonmigrants and 6,868 return migrants. The 2000 census recorded 
4,535,926 nonmigrants and 38,112 return migrants. Of the return migrants in 2000, 17,235 are return migrants 
who lived sometime within the last 5 years in the US. In 2010, there were 5,521,552 nonmigrants and 108,691 
return migrants. Of the return migrants in 2010, 21,978 were return migrants who lived sometime within the 
last 5 years in the US. 
7  In 1990, 1,581,113 nonmigrants and 3,083 return migrants had valid hourly wages; 2,154,906 nonmigrants 
and 17048 return migrants had valid hourly wages in 2000; and 2,429,803 nonmigrants and 54,235 return 
migrants had valid hourly wages in 2010. 13 
 
4.1  Descriptive  Statistics 
 
Table 1
8 shows the main features of the return migrants (column RM) and the 
stayers (column S) among the three censuses. The return migrants tend to be younger than 
the rest of the population by 1 to 3 years. In addition, the return migrants are mostly 
composed of men; the proportion of men among the return migrants increased from 66 
percent in 1990 to 76 percent in 2010. 
We classified the six groups of states in accordance with their migration rates in 
1950.
9 Using this classification, we try to identify the individuals’ access to migration 
networks. High-migration states are Aguascalientes, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, 
Michoacan, San Luis Potosi and Zacatecas. All of them are located at the center of Mexico. 
Low-migration states are Campeche, Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Tabasco and Veracruz and 
Yucatan. All of these states are located in southern Mexico. The third group is composed of 
states that exhibited an intermediate rate of migration in 1950: Colima, Mexico State, 
Guerrero, Hidalgo, Morelos, Nayarit Oaxaca, Puebla, Queretaro, Tlaxcala and Sinaloa. The 
fourth group consists of the states located in northern Mexico: Baja California, Baja 
California Sur, Chihuahua, Coahuila and Sonora Tamaulipas. Finally, we consider the state 
of Nuevo Leon (NL) and Mexico City as isolated regions because of their economic 
importance. 
The table shows how the geographical location patterns of the return migrants have 
changed over time. The number of migrants returning to states with historically high 
migration rates has declined from 50 percent to only 35 percent, whereas the proportion of 
nonmigrants is only 21 percent. More migrants have returned to the states with low and 
intermediate migration rates with each census. Although the number of migrants returning 
to the north declined from 1990 to 2000, this number remained stable from 2000 to 2010. 
At the same time, the proportion of the nonmigrant population was stable across all regions 
in the three censuses. Mexico City and Nuevo Leon showed a low rate of return migration, 
and the importance of these states to the return migrant population has decreased over time. 
Another characteristic of the geographical location patterns of the return migrants is 
                                                       
8  We used the weights provided in each of the censuses in our descriptive statistics and estimates, except 
when we defined the size of the sample N. 
9  We follow the classification proposed by Hanson (2007). 14 
 
the growing importance of the rural sector. Although the rural sector accounted for 28 
percent of the return migrant population in 1990, by 2010 that proportion had risen to 36 
percent. This change occurred even though the importance of the rural sector to the 
nonmigrants decreased from 25 percent in 1990 to 20 percent in 2010. 
The locations of the return migrants in different regions of the rural sector have 
followed a pattern similar to that of the total population. The proportion of return migrants 
in the rural sector has decreased in the high-migration states but has increased in states with 
low and intermediate migration rates and has remained stable in the north. 
The indigenous population has produced fewer return migrants than nonmigrants. 
However, the proportion of the indigenous population serving as return migrants increased 
from 2 to 4 percent, whereas the proportion of indigenous people among the nonmigrant 
population has decreased from 8 in 1990 to 7 percent in 2010. 
With regard to the years of education, the difference between return migrants and 
nonmigrants has changed over time. Whereas in 1990, the return migrants had 0.57 more 
years of education than the nonmigrants, in 2010, the return migrants had 0.84 fewer years 
of education than the nonmigrants. The average education level has increased for both 
groups.
10 
In terms of educational groups, the results indicate that the selection of return 
migrants has evolved toward negative selection. Over the years, the proportion of return 
migrants with no formal education is lower compared with the proportion of nonmigrants in 
the same level. In addition, the proportion of return migrants with incomplete primary 
schooling is similar to that of nonmigrants. Nevertheless, whereas in 1990, the proportion 
of individuals in secondary and higher educational groups was similar for both return 
migrants and nonmigrants, by 2010, the proportion of nonmigrants in high school and 
college had become larger than the proportion of return migrants in high school and 
college. 
 
4.2    Male and Female Differences 
                                                       
10  We define the educational groups by six consecutive levels: No Education, Primary Incomplete, Primary, 
Secondary, High School and College. Primary Incomplete, Primary, Secondary, High School and College 
indicate that the individual completed 1-5 years, 6-8 years, 9-11 years, 12-16 years and 17 years or more of 
schooling, respectively. This classification reflects the structure of the Mexican educational system.   15 
 
 
Most of the previous studies on selection and Mexican migration to the United 
States have focused on men. However, women represent an important proportion of return 
migrants (i.e., 34 percent in 1990 and 24 percent in 2010). Hence, it is important to 
investigate any possible gender differences. Table 2 shows the main characteristics of the 
male population, and Table 3 contains the characteristics of the women. Both tables include 
important labor market characteristics, such as wages, and labor market participation rates. 
In both cases, the return migrants are younger than and exhibit almost the same 
propensity to be married as the nonmigrant population. However, the two populations differ 
in many other respects. For example, with regard to the size of locality, the female return 
migrants exhibit a lower tendency to reside in rural areas than the males. The female rural 
population represented less than 30 percent of the return migrants, whereas the male rural 
population constituted more than 30 percent of the return migrants in the three censuses. 
In terms of education, the female return migrants have a higher level of education 
than the nonmigrants. Conversely, the male return migrants exhibit less education than the 
nonmigrant population. In 1990, the difference in education levels between the female 
return migrants and nonmigrants was 1.37 years, which decreased to 0.28 in 2010. In 
contrast, the difference between the male return migrants and nonmigrants was -0.11 years 
in 1990. By 2010, the negative difference had become -1.34 years. Positive selection in 
terms of education is disappearing among the women and becoming more negative in the 
case of the men. 
Both the male and female return migrants exhibit larger rates of unemployment. We 
measure this rate as the proportion of the population who stated that they had sought work 
the week before the census. Additionally, in both cases, fewer return migrants are employed 
compared with the nonmigrant population. 
The return migrants have higher wages than the nonmigrants, except for the men in 
2010. As in the case of education, the wage differences for both the men and the women are 
more favorable for the return migrants in 1990 than in 2010. For the males in 1990, the log 
wage difference was 0.42, which decreased to 0.13 in 2000 and became a negative 
difference of -0.09 in 2010. For the women, the difference has always been positive in 
favor of the return migrants. It was 0.49 in 1990 but decreased to 0.25 in 2001 and to only 16 
 
0.05 in 2010. Using our estimation methodology, we aim to explain the part of these 
differences that are attributable to the differences in human capital prior to the migration 
and to the migration process itself. 
With respect to the number of hours worked per week, both the men and the women 
tend to work less if they are return migrants, although the difference is small. Interestingly, 
both the male and female return migrants exhibit a greater tendency to become 
entrepreneurs or to be self-employed. This trend remained stable during the period of the 
study. However, the return migrants are employed in a lower proportion of jobs that offer 
health insurance (i.e., formal sector jobs) as part of the employment benefits. 
The descriptive statistics suggest that the selection in terms of education and wages 
are becoming more negative for both the men and the women. This pattern also holds 
regardless of whether we focus on the full population or the working population (i.e., the 
last row in tables 2 and 3). Hence, we can infer that excluding the women from the analysis 
can skew the results toward negative selection. We account for this bias in our analysis by 
estimating the selection among the men and the women as separate cases. 
 
5  Results 
 
Following the previous literature, we construct the counterfactual distribution of the 
wages that the return migrants would have obtained had they never migrated. As a first 
step, we look into the distributions of log hourly wages before estimating the 
counterfactuals. We consider the distributions of the men and women separately in each of 
the censuses. 
To estimate  ) | = ( z s I f  and  ) | = ( z m I f , we used a logit model for the full 
sample, with a dependent variable indicating whether the individual was a return migrant. 
We divided age into 8 groups of 5 years, and we formed indicative variables for each 
group. To consider the high dependence of return migration on geographical variables, we 
used dummies for each of the following regions: high-migration states, low-migration 
states, intermediate-migration states, North, Mexico City, NL, rural, high-migration rural, 
low-migration rural, intermediate-migration rural and north rural. In addition, we used an 
indigenous membership variable. To include education, we used dummies for each 17 
 
aforementioned level of education. Using the logit estimates, we obtained the weight 
) = ( ) | = (
) = ( ) | = (
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and constructed the counterfactual distribution of the wages 
that the return migrants would have obtained had they never migrated, as indicated in 
equation (4), by using kernel methods. 
 
5.1  Selection  by  year 
 
Figure 1
11 shows the results for the men in the 1990 census. Figure 1a shows the 
observed wage distributions for the return migrants and the nonmigrants. Figure 1c shows 
the difference between the two distributions. There is a vertical line at the median of the 
nonmigrants. We can see that the wage distribution of the return migrants is clearly to the 
right of the distribution of the nonmigrants. This finding implies positive selection. 
Figure 1b shows the observed wage distribution of the nonmigrants and the 
counterfactual distribution of the wages that the return migrants would have obtained had 
they not migrated. Figure 1d shows the difference between these two distributions. 
Compared with the nonmigrants, a greater proportion of the return migrants are located in 
the middle and upper parts of the distribution, and fewer migrants are located in the lower 
part of the distribution. This evidence suggests positive selection among the male return 
migrants in 1990. 
Table 4 shows another approach to observing these patterns. The table contains 
statistics on the observed wage distributions and the counterfactual wage distributions for 
the men and the women in each year. For the men in 1990, we can see that the average 
wage and the wage in each percentile of the return migrants’ wage distribution are higher 
than those for the nonmigrants. On average, the return migrants earn 42 percent more than 
the nonmigrants. The same is observed for the counterfactual distributions. Each percentile 
of the return migrants’ counterfactual distribution is located to the right of the percentiles of 
the nonmigrants’ distribution, except for the 90th and 95th percentiles. In 1990, the return 
                                                       
11  We constructed all of the figures by using an Epanechnikov kernel. We used two times Silverman’s (1986) 
optimal bandwidth. As in the analysis of Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), we found that the appearance of 
densities resulting from the use of the optimal bandwidth presented problems for our analysis. Two times the 
optimal bandwidth resulted in figures similar to those reported previously in the literature. Furthermore, the 
bandwidth chosen has no effects on the counterfactual statistics that use the reweighting factor. 18 
 
migrants would have earned, on average, 6 percent more than the nonmigrants had the 
return migrants never left the country (i.e., 3.17 minus 3.11). The difference between the 
observed wages that the return migrants received and the wages that they would have 
obtained equals 36 percent, which is a large positive effect. We call this effect the wage 
premium for migrating and returning. 
One can note a similar pattern of positive self-selection in the case of the women in 
1990 in Figure 2. The wage distribution of the return migrants has fewer individuals in the 
median of the nonmigrant wage distribution and a larger mass in the right tail of the wage 
distribution. After we estimate the counterfactual, we observe a decrease in the differences 
across both distributions, but evidence of positive selection still exists. Table 4 shows that 
the wages for the female return migrants are 49 percent higher than the nonmigrants’ 
wages. If the female migrants had not migrated, then they would have obtained wages that 
are 11 percent higher. The wage premiums for migrating and returning equals 38 percent. 
The distributions of the men in the 2000 census can be seen in Figure 3. The wage 
distributions show that fewer return migrants are in the lower part of distribution and that 
more return migrants are in the middle and upper parts of the distribution. After we 
estimated the counterfactual distribution, we found that the positive selection pattern 
observed in 1990 changes. The return migrants are drawn more from the middle of the 
distribution and less from the upper and lower parts of the distribution. In the graph, it is 
difficult to know whether the selection is positive or negative. 
Table 4 also shows the statistics of the wage distributions in the year 2000. For the 
men, the percentiles of the wage distribution for the return migrants are still to the right of 
the percentiles of the distribution for the nonmigrants, but the average difference between 
the two groups has decreased. However, when we analyze the statistics in the 
counterfactual distribution, the return migrants are only located to the right of the 
nonmigrants in the 5th to 25th percentiles, whereas the nonmigrants tend to receive higher 
wages in the higher percentiles. This finding shows that the return migrants tend to be 
located disproportionally in the middle of the distribution. As a result, the wages that the 
return migrants would have obtained had they not migrated is slightly less than the 
nonmigrants’ wages by 5 percent on average. Additionally, whereas the return migrants’ 
wages were more than 36 percent higher than the nonmigrants’ wages in 1990, this number 19 
 
had decreased to 18 percent by 2000. 
Figure 4 shows the data on the women in the 2000 census. The wage distribution of 
the return migrants is clearly to the right of the nonmigrants’ wage distribution. The 
counterfactual distribution shows a pattern in which the return migrants are drawn more 
from the middle and the upper middle parts of the distribution and less from the lower part. 
This finding suggests a pattern of positive selection for the women in the 2000 census. The 
percentiles in Table 4 show that the selection pattern remains positive for the women. In 
both cases, the wages obtained after migrating are higher than the wages that the women 
would have obtained had they not migrated. Additionally, the percentiles of the return 
migrants’ wage distributions are higher than the percentiles of the nonmigrants’ 
distribution. On average, the return migrants’ wages are 25 percent higher than the 
nonmigrants’ wages, and the counterfactual wages of the return migrants are 8 percent 
larger than the nonmigrants’ wages. 
In 2010, the pattern of selection is negative for men, as shown in Figure 5. Using 
the counterfactual distribution, we can show that there are more return migrants in the 
lower-to-middle part of the wage distribution. If we analyze the statistics shown in Table 4 
for the men in 2010, then the counterfactual distribution of the return migrants and the 
distribution of the nonmigrants only coincide in percentile 5. In the rest of the percentiles, 
the return migrants are to the left of the nonmigrants. This finding indicates that the return 
migrants have lower wages than those of the nonmigrants. The difference between the 
wages that the return migrants would have obtained had they not migrated and those of the 
nonmigrants is -14 percent. The wage premium of migrating and returning is equal to 5 
percent. Hence, this wage premium has also decreased over time. 
Figure 6 shows the self-selection patterns for the women in 2010. The return 
migrants are somewhat more concentrated near the median of the nonmigrants’ wage 
distribution and less among the high and low wages. According to Table 4, the difference 
between the wages that the return migrants would have experienced had they not migrated 
and those of the nonmigrants is -2 percent. In the lower part of the distribution (i.e., in the 
5th and 10th percentiles), the return migrants are located to the right of the nonmigrants’ 
distribution, whereas in the higher wages, the return migrants are to the left of the 
nonmigrants. This finding indicates that the return migrants are selected from the middle of 20 
 
the distribution. 
To determine whether the differences between the nonmigrants’ wage distribution 
and the counterfactual distribution of the wages that the return migrants would have earned 
had they not migrated are statistically significant, we calculate the standard error of the 
difference by using 250 bootstrap repetitions. Table 5 shows the results. Overall, the 
standard errors are small, and most of the differences are statistically significant, except for 
the women in 2010 in the 20th and 25th percentiles of the wage distribution. 
 
5.2  Selection  over  time 
 
The above results show that the self-selection among the return migrants tends to 
become negative over time. The same is true for both the men and the women. One concern 
about comparing changes in self-selection by using the estimates in each year is that doing 
so may confound the changes in the compositions of immigrant and resident populations 
with the changes in skill prices.
12 To address this concern, we must keep the skill returns 
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With this weight, we adjust the characteristics of the nonmigrants in 2010 according 
to the characteristics of the return migrants in 1990. Using this weight over the distribution 
of the nonmigrants in 2010 generates the counterfactual distribution of the wages that the 
return migrants would have earned in 1990 had they been paid as nonmigrants in 2010. For 
the nonmigrants in 1990, we calculate the following: 
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12  Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) p. 264. 21 
 
Applying this weight over the distribution of the nonmigrants in 2010 generates the 
counterfactual distribution of the wages that the nonmigrants would have earned in 1990 
had they been paid as nonmigrants in 2010. Using equations (7) and (8), we can 
nonparametrically estimate the degree of selection for the return migrants in 1990 by 
evaluating this estimate in terms of the skill prices in 2010: 
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Following a similar approach, we can estimate the degree of selection in 2000 by 
evaluating equation (9) in terms of the skill prices in 2010. For the 2010 census, we only 
use the 2010 estimates generated in the previous section. 
Figures 7 and 8 show the difference between the return migrants’ wage distribution 
and nonmigrants’ wage distribution when their characteristics are priced as nonmigrants in 
2010 for the men and the women, respectively. The vertical line shows the median log 
wages in 2010 for the nonmigrants. For the men, Figure 7 shows a pattern of positive 
selection in 1990, intermediate selection in 2000 and negative selection in 2010. For the 
women, Figure 8 shows positive selection in 1990 and 2000 but intermediate selection in 
2010. 
The results of these estimates also appear in Table 6. For the men, we find a positive 
selection of 5 percent in 1990, a negative selection of 5 percent in 2000 and a negative 
selection of 14 percent in 2010. Similar to the pattern obtained in the previous section, the 
results show that the degree of selection becomes more negative. For the women, the results 
also show that the degree of selection becomes more negative. In 1990, the women show an 
average positive selection of 12 percent. They show a positive selection of 5 percent in 
2000 and a negative selection of 2 percent in 2010. In the column DIF, we show the 
differences in the statistics and the bootstrapped standard errors of the difference. Again, 
the differences in the distributions are statistically significant at the mean, variance and 
almost every percentile. The previous results show that the growing negativity in the degree 
of selection is not due to a change in the returns of the nonmigrants’ characteristics. 
 
5.3  Extensions 22 
 
 
Previous studies on self-selection among permanent migrants have shown that the 
type and degree of selection tends to differ if we focus on different groups. 
Fernandez-Huertas (2011) finds that in the rural sector, selection is positive, whereas in the 
urban sector, selection is negative. McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) show that the degree of 
selection depends on the people’s access to migration networks. In areas with highly 
developed migration networks, selection will tend to be negative, whereas in areas with 
underdeveloped networks, selection could be positive. We determine whether these patterns 
hold among the male return migrants. 
Table 7 shows the results of the wage differences (only males) between the return 
migrants and the nonmigrants in the urban and rural sectors. The type of selection has 
always been positive in the rural areas. In 1990, the male return migrants would have 
obtained wages that are 21 percent higher than those of the nonmigrants if the migrants had 
never left the country. In 2000, this difference was equal to 17 percent, and in 2010, this 
difference declined to 4 percent. The 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles are higher in the return 
migrants’ counterfactual distribution than in the nonmigrants’ distribution in the rural 
sector in 1990 and 2000. In 2010, only the 10th percentile is higher in the counterfactual 
distribution of the return migrants, whereas the 50th percentile is the same for both 
distributions, and the 90th percentile is higher in the nonmigrants’ distribution. This finding 
indicates that a small number of return migrants are low-wage workers and that this effect 
dominates the fact that few migrants with high wages exist in the rural sector in 2010. 
In the urban sector, the type of selection changes from positive in 1990 to negative 
in 2000 and 2010. In other words, the selection is becoming more negative over time. In 
1990, the percentiles of the return migrants’ counterfactual wage distribution are larger than 
those of the nonmigrants’ distribution, although the difference is only 2 log points in the 
90th percentile. This finding suggests that, although the average difference is positive, the 
difference is due to the greater presence of return migrants in the middle of the distribution 
and not at the top. Although in 2000, the wages of the return migrants and the nonmigrants 
in the 50th percentile are equal, the return migrants’ wages are greater than the nonmigrants 
in the 10th percentile and lower in the 90th percentile. In 2010, the percentiles of the return 
migrants’ counterfactual wage distribution are lower than those of the nonmigrants’ 23 
 
distribution. In sum, the evidence from the urban sector indicates a change toward negative 
selection. 
Overall, the rural sector exhibits positive selection, and the urban sector changes 
from positive to negative selection. However, the pattern is becoming more negative in 
both sectors. Thus, the change in the type of selection from 1990 to 2010 is not a result of 
the increased number of rural workers becoming return migrants. In both rural and urban 
areas, the return migrants receive higher wages than the wages they would have obtained 
had they not migrated (i.e., the observed wage of the return migrant minus the 
counterfactual wage). This difference has fallen over time in both groups. In 1990, the male 
return migrants in the rural sector obtained hourly wages that were 35 percent higher than 
the wages they would have obtained had they not migrated. In the urban sector, this 
difference was 34 percent. In 2000, the increase in wages dropped to 14 percent within the 
rural population and to 19 percent within the urban population. In 2010, the difference was 
7 and 3 percent in the rural and urban sectors, respectively. Thus, the wage premium for 
migrating to the US and returning back to Mexico has fallen over time. 
To investigate the effect of migration networks, we divide the Mexican states 
between those with a long migratory tradition and the rest.
13 We expect that the migration 
networks are more developed in states in which the rate of migration has been historically 
high. If McKenzie and Rapoport’s (2010) proposal is true, then we should find more 
evidence of negative selection in states with a tradition of high migration rates. 
Table 7 shows the results. The difference between the nonmigrants’ wages and the 
wages that the return migrants would have earned had they never migrated increased from 8 
percent in 1990 to 17 percent in 2010 in states with a history of high immigration rates. The 
10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the counterfactual wage distribution for the return 
migrants are always to the left of the percentiles of the nonmigrants’ distribution. This 
finding provides evidence of negative selection. In the rest of the states, the pattern changed 
from positive selection of 17 percent in 1990 to negative selection of 13 percent in 2010. 
The percentiles in the rest of states show that in 1990, the counterfactual wage distribution 
of the return migrants lay to the right of the nonmigrants’ wage distribution. However, the 
                                                       
13  The states with the highest rates of migration in 1950 were Aguascalientes, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, 
Michoacan, San Luis Potosi and Zacatecas. 24 
 
selection pattern has become more negative over time. 
The states with high migration rates show a greater degree of negative selection 
each year. This finding is consistent with McKenzie and Rapoport’s (2010) hypothesis. 
Moreover, the type of selection has become more negative over time in both types of states. 
Interestingly, the wage premium associated with migration differs between the states with 
high migration rates and the rest. In the states with high migration rates, the wage premium 
is lower than that in the rest of the states. In 1990, return migration was associated with a 
wage premium of 23 percent in the states with high migration rates and 45 percent in the 
rest of the country. In 2000, the wage premium was 10 percent in states with high migration 
rates and 24 percent in the rest of the country. In 2010, the premium was null in states with 
high migration rates and equal to 7 percent in the rest of the states. 
 
5.4  Robustness 
 
To establish the validity of the results shown in Figures 1 to 8 and Table 4, we 
perform some robustness tests. One possible critique of our study is that the unobserved 
components may bias the results. However, Kaestner and Malamud (2010) use a different 
survey and find little evidence of selection bias from unobservables. Hence, if the 
unobservables are correlated with the nonlinear functions of the observable characteristics, 
then adding these nonlinear functions should mitigate the possible bias. To do so, we 
estimate  ) | = ( z s I f  and  ) | = ( z m I f   by using the interactions between the respondents’ 
years of education and each of the six geographical areas, the interactions between the 
years of education and each of the age groups, the interactions between the age and the six 
geographical areas, and the interactions between the rural sector and each educational level. 
The counterfactual wage distributions changed only slightly. The average counterfactual 
wage changed by no more than 2 log points. Table 8 shows the results under the column 
ALL. The first column (OR) in the table for each year shows the counterfactual estimates of 
Table 4.   
Additionally, we obtained the wage distributions of both the return migrants and the 
nonmigrants from the individuals with valid wages, but we constructed the counterfactual 
distribution while considering the characteristics of all of the migrants, as if they had 25 
 
participated in the labor market in the same manner as the nonmigrants. Doing so may also 
have biased our results. To determine whether this decision has important effects on our 
estimates, we restrict the sample to only those with valid wages. The second column 
(REST) in Table 8 shows the estimates generated by using the restricted sample. Once 
again, the results show no major changes, and the counterfactual average wage does not 
differ by more than 2 log points from the results in Table 4. The type of selection still 
becomes more negative over time, and the wage premia still decline because of migration.   
Another concern is that the results could be due to the differences in the age 
structures between the migrant population and the nonmigrants. To determine if the age 
structure changes our results, we restricted the male sample to only the migrants between 
20 and 35 years old. Table 9 shows the results. In terms of selection, the results are similar 
to those provided in Table 4. There is a positive selection of 4 percent in 1990, a negative 
selection of only 3 percent in 2000 and a negative selection of 10 percent in 2010. The 
immigration wage premium also follows the same pattern as that shown in Table 4.   
The census only captures the migrants who returned within five years before the 
data were collected. Thus, it is difficult to know whether the migrants have temporarily or 
permanently returned to Mexico. A second weakness in the census is that we are only 
aware of the international migratory activities over a period of 5 years. Many individuals 
who have migrated in the past are considered nonmigrants in the census. The census does 
not contain information that allows us to resolve the potential bias caused by these 
characteristics of the census. However, we use a survey that may counteract this possible 
bias. The 2006 Social Mobility Survey (EMS) asked individuals if they had traveled to the 
United States to work for a month or more at least once in their life.
14 Using this survey, 
we can completely separate the population that has migrated at least once to work in the 
United States from those who have not. 
We apply the same methodology by using the EMS as a robustness test. We 
concentrate on men because the survey was designed to interview mostly men. Table 10 
shows the results. In 2006, the wages that the return migrants would have obtained had they 
not migrated is 3 percent lower than the wages of the nonmigrants. The immigration wage 
                                                       
14  The survey was designed by Centro de Estudios Espinosa Yglesias, a civil association funded by 
Fundacion Espinosa Rugarcia (http://www.ceey.org.mx).   26 
 
premium is 7 percent. The evidence suggests that the return migrants are more concentrated 
to the left of the median of the nonmigrants’ wage distribution given that the 10th 
percentile is larger for the migrants, but the 90th percentile is higher for the nonmigrants. 
This result is similar to our observation in the 2000 census for men. Additionally, the fact 
that the average selection is less negative in the EMS does not eliminate the possibility of a 
slightly positive selection in the earlier years, as we estimated from the 1990 census. 
Hence, the census’s restriction of immigrant status to the previous 5 years does not affect 
the main results and, in fact, the EMS supports the evidence provided by the 1990 and 2000 
censuses. 
Recent articles about the self-selection among Mexican migrants (e.g., 
Fernandez-Huertas 2011, Kaestner and Malamud 2010, and Ambrosini and Peri 2011) 
focus on the period from 2000 to 2005. We also use a survey conducted in 2006. This 
survey captures information about the return migrants in that period by using the same 
methodology employed in the 2000 census. The National Survey of Demographic 
Dynamics (ENADID) asked if any of the members of the respondents’ households traveled 
to the United States with the objective of living in that country since 2001 and whether the 
same member had returned within the same period. The survey also asked for the locations 
in which the members of the household had lived five years before the census took place.
15 
Table 10 provides the results of this survey for the men. The difference between the wages 
that the return migrants would have earned had they not migrated and the wages of the 
nonmigrants is 4 percent. The immigration wage premium is equal to 11 percent. Although 
ENADID uses the same methodology as the census, the results are similar to those found 
by the EMS. Nevertheless, both surveys do not show the large negative difference found in 
the 2010 census. This finding suggests that the self-selection pattern among the return 
migrants became more negative after 2006. The shocks suffered by the US economy after 
2006 may explain part of the increasingly negative self-selection pattern. 
We can make an additional comparison by using the information regarding the 
return migrants in a survey that employs a methodology similar to that of the labor force 
survey used by Fernandez-Huertas’s (2011). This survey reports the greatest negative 
selection regarding Mexican migrants in the literature. The National Survey of Employment 
                                                       
15  The survey is available at INEGI (http://www.inegi.org.mx).  27 
 
and Occupation (ENOE) is a Mexican survey designed to capture the evolution of 
employment and unemployment since 2005. Each household is interviewed for 5 
consecutive quarters. From the second interview on, the households report whether a new 
member is immigrating or whether the household has lost a member because of migration. 
We use the same methodology employed for the men in Table 4 for the data extracted from 
the third quarter of 2005 to the second quarter of 2007. However, before taking the 
logarithm of the wages, we estimate the wages relative to the average wages of the quarter 
to avoid seasonal effects, as proposed by Fernandez-Huertas (2011). 
Table 10 provides the results under the column ENOE. The wages that the return 
migrants would have earned had they not migrated is 19 percent less than the wages of the 
nonmigrants. Contrary to all previous estimates, the wages obtained by the return migrants 
is 12 percent less than the counterfactual wages. In sum, after the migrants return, the return 
migrants earn a wage that is 31 percent less than that of the nonmigrants. This finding 
suggests that the return migrants become more negatively selected if we analyze the flow 
and not the stock, possibly because of the existence of low-skilled migrants who tend to 
make more trips. Nonetheless, three different surveys of the census show negative selection 
for the return migrants. 
 
5.5  Implications 
 
An important aspect to consider is whether the return migrants exhibit different 
skills from the permanent migrants. According to the discussion in section 2, these skills 
should be different in the Bratsberg and Borjas (1997) framework. However, with our 
datasets, we cannot directly test this prediction. Nonetheless, our results are similar to the 
findings regarding Mexican permanent migrants that were reported in the recent literature. 
For example, using the 2000 Census, Ibarraran and Lubotsky (2007) find that male 
Mexican migrants have 0.56 fewer years of schooling than the males in nonmigrant 
households. This finding almost coincides with our statistics, which indicate that the male 
return migrants have 0.64 fewer years of schooling than the nonmigrants. With respect to 
Chiquiar and Hanson’s (2005) results, we also find evidence of positive selection among 
both the men and the women in 1990 as well as evidence of positive selection among the 28 
 
women and intermediate selection among the men in 2000. This finding suggests that the 
differences in skills between the return migrants and the permanent migrants who settle in 
the United States could be small. 
The evidence suggests that migration networks play an important role in alleviating 
the migration costs experienced by low-skilled individuals, as suggested by McKenzie and 
Rapoport (2010). The tendency to find negative selection increases as time goes on, 
regardless of the subgroups being considered. Moreover, in states with a long migration 
tradition, the self-selection patterns are negative, as predicted by Bratsberg and Borjas 
(1996), whereas in states with weak migration networks, the self-selection patterns tend to 
be positive or less negative. Future research should tackle the importance of alternative 
hypotheses to explain why the selection among the Mexican return migrants becomes more 
negative over time. Factors such as changes in the demand for labor because of shocks to 
both economies or the effect of changes to the enforcement of migration laws may play an 
important role. 
There are important differences in the selection patterns between the men and the 
women among the return migrants. Not considering the women in the analysis biases the 
results toward finding negative selection. If these differences also exist among permanent 
migrants, as Chiquiar and Hanson’s (2005) results suggest, then omitting women from the 
analysis of the selection patterns may produce misleading conclusions.   
 
6  Conclusions 
 
In this article, we analyzed the self-selection patterns of return migrants in Mexico 
by using the censuses for the years 1990, 2000 and 2010. In particular, we followed 
DiNardo et al.’s (1996) methodology to calculate the counterfactual wages that the return 
migrants would have earned had they not migrated. This methodology has been used to 
analyze the selection of Mexican immigrants into the United States (Chiquiar and Hanson 
2005; Fernandez-Huertas 2011) but has not been utilized to analyze the selection of return 
migration into Mexico. We presented evidence suggesting that the self-selection patterns 
among the Mexican return migrants have changed over time (i.e., from positive selection in 
1990 to negative selection in 2010). For example, the wages that the male return migrants 29 
 
would have earned had they not migrated is 6 percent larger than the wages of the male 
nonmigrants. However, by 2010, this difference had declined to -14 percent. The growing 
negativity of the degree of positive selection is robust to the analysis of specific subgroups: 
rural and urban, men and women, and states with high migration rates and low migration 
rates. Furthermore, the negative selection results are robust with respect to the dataset used. 
We employed different datasets that measure the flow and stock of return migrants in 
different ways. The negative selection result is stronger in the sample that measures the 
flow of the return migrants.   
Important differences exist among the different subgroups. Women tend to show 
more positive selection than men. For men in the rural sector, selection has been positive 
since 1990. However, states with high migration rates have shown negative selection since 
1990. This last result is consistent with the role of migration networks in alleviating 
migration costs. 
In general, the self-selection patterns tend to coincide with the results found in the 
literature on Mexican migrants living in the United States. For example, previous studies 
indicate that women are positively selected and that men show intermediate selection. We 
also find similar results for the censuses taken in the years 1990 and 2000. However, we 
find that the selection of the return migrants became more negative from 1990 to 2010. The 
similarity between our results and those of previous studies on Mexican migrants in the 
United States suggests that the differences in skills between return migrants and permanent 
migrants could be small. 
An interesting result is that the observed wages of the return migrants are higher 
than the wages that they would have earned had they not migrated. In other words, there is 
a wage premium to migrate and return. This premium shows that migration has a positive 
effect on the Mexican economy. The previous literature on Mexican migration to the 
United States has neglected to study this effect. Hence, further research is necessary to 
understand the factors driving migrants to return to Mexico. Such research would help 
policymakers design return migration policies that may reduce the concern of a massive 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics: Full population. 
1990 2000  2010 
    S RM S  RM  S  RM 
                   
N   3,433,584 6,868 4,535,926 38,067 5,521,552  108,691
Age   34.4 33.3 35.1 32.5 36.6  34.3
Male   0.48 0.66 0.47 0.73 0.47  0.76
                      
Rural   0.25 0.28 0.22 0.32 0.20  0.36
High  Migration  Region     0.21 0.5 0.2 0.45 0.21  0.35
Low Migration Region        0.15 0.01 0.15 0.04 0.15  0.09
Intermediate Migration 
Region  0.34 0.15 0.36 0.28 0.37 0.36
North Region  0.14 0.25 0.14 0.16 0.14  0.16
Mexico City    0.12 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.09  0.02
NL 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04  0.02
High Migration: Rural    0.06 0.20 0.05 0.19 0.05  0.15
Low Migration: Rural    0.06 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.06  0.05
North Region: Rural    0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.02
Intermediate Migration: 
Rural    0.10 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.14
Indigenous   0.08 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.07  0.04
                      
Years of Schooling    6.36 6.93 7.98 7.91 9.26  8.42
No Education    0.15 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.05  0.02
Primary Incomplete    0.25 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.11  0.12
Primary      0.26 0.32 0.25 0.30 0.20  0.28
Secondary   0.20 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.28  0.35
High School      0.10 0.11 0.21 0.18 0.28  0.20
College   0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.07  0.03
Notes: The sample is restricted to individuals who are 20-59 years old. Indigenous is a dichotomic variable representing the 
population that speaks an indigenous language. The states were divided into the following groups. i) High migration: 
Aguascalientes, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, San Luis Potosí and Zacatecas; ii) low migration: Campeche, 
Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Tabasco and Veracruz; iii) intermediate migration: Colima, Estado de México, Guerrero, Hidalgo, 
Morelos, Nayarit Oaxaca, Puebla, Querétaro and Tlaxcala y Sinaloa; iv) north region: Baja California, Baja California Sur, 
Chihuahua, Coahuila and Sonora Tamaulipas. Nuevo Leon (NL) and Mexico City are considered separately. Rural represents 
the population living in areas with 2500 inhabitants or fewer. Years of schooling includes only the completed years. Primary 
incomplete, Primary, Secondary, High School and College indicate 1-5 years of schooling, 6-8 years of schooling, 9-11 years 








Table 2. Descriptive statistics: Men 
1990 2000  2010 
   S  RM  S  RM  S  RM 
                   
N   1,643,304 4,537 2,142,705 28,962 2,584,619  85,208
Age   34.5 33.4 35.2 32.5 36.5  34.3
Married   0.74 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.70  0.72
                      
Rural   0.26 0.32 0.22 0.35 0.2  0.39
Years of Schooling    6.87 6.76 8.3 7.66 9.46  8.12
No Education    0.12 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.04  0.03
Primary Incomplete    0.24 0.26 0.18 0.20 0.11  0.13
Primary      0.26 0.32 0.24 0.31 0.20  0.30
Secondary   0.20 0.19 0.25 0.28 0.29  0.36
High School      0.12 0.10 0.21 0.15 0.28  0.17
College   0.05 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.08  0.02
                      
Unemployed   0.021 0.031 0.012 0.020 0.045  0.073
Employed   0.73 0.59 0.74 0.59 0.71  0.65
Log hourly wage    3.11 3.53 3.02 3.15 3.20  3.11
Hours worked    46.3 45.4 48.9 47.3 49.2  48.0
Self employment    0.24 0.29 0.21 0.26 0.21  0.24
Entrepeneur activities    0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03  0.04
Health  insurance           0.58 0.37 0.57  0.32
Schooling if working    7.15 7.31 8.62 8.13 9.65  8.31
Notes: The sample is restricted to individuals who are 20-59 years old. Married includes marriages without civil contracts. 
Persons are unemployed if they have searched for a job within the last week. Our calculation of wages excludes unknown or 
invalid wages. Hourly wages are in constant pesos as of June 2010 according to the Consumer Price Index of Banco de 











Table 3. Descriptive statistics: Women 
1990 2000  2010 
    S RM S RM S  RM 
                   
N   1,790,280 2,331 2,393,221 9,105 2,936,933  23,483
Age   34.3 33 35 32.4 36.6  34.2
Married   0.73 0.77 0.70 0.71 0.67  0.73
                      
Rural   0.25 0.2 0.21 0.24 0.21  0.27
Years of Schooling    5.9 7.27 7.7 8.64 9.09  9.37
No Education    0.17 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.06  0.02
Primary Incomplete    0.25 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.12  0.09
Primary      0.27 0.33 0.25 0.28 0.21  0.24
Secondary   0.20 0.24 0.23 0.27 0.28  0.33
High School      0.09 0.12 0.21 0.24 0.28  0.28
College   0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06  0.04
                      
Unemployed   0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.011  0.018
Employed   0.22 0.18 0.33 0.26 0.37  0.31
Log hourly wage    3.17 3.66 3.02 3.27 3.19  3.24
Hours worked    40.8 39.9 40.2 40.2 40.5  39.9
Self employment    0.13 0.19 0.20 0.25 0.23  0.31
Entrepeneur Activities    0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02  0.04
Health  insurance           0.64 0.54 0.62  0.49
Schooling if Working    8.57 9.24 9.50 10.24 10.53  10.35
Notes: The sample is restricted to individuals who are 20-59 years old. Married includes marriages without civil contracts. 
Persons are unemployed if they have searched for a job within the last week. Our calculation of wages excludes unknown or 
invalid wages. Hourly wages are in constant pesos as of June 2010 according to the Consumer Price Index of Banco de 














Table 4. Wage distributions statistics 
1990 2000  2010 
    S  RM  CF  S  RM CF  S  RM CF 
M A L E                                   
N   1194679  2659     1477186 15095     1599986  48671
Mean   3.11  3.53  3.17 3.02 3.15 2.97 3.20  3.11 3.06
Var   1.10  1.45  1.05 0.78 0.83 0.64 0.65  0.59 0.51
                                  
5 per    1.41  1.75  1.56 1.78 2.04 1.89 2.11  2.11 2.11
10 per    2.09  2.41  2.21 2.07 2.24 2.11 2.33  2.33 2.29
25 per    2.56  2.88  2.66 2.45 2.58 2.47 2.69  2.66 2.64
50 per    3.10  3.45  3.12 2.92 2.98 2.87 3.11  3.02 2.98
75 per    3.66  4.20  3.69 3.49 3.56 3.35 3.61  3.43 3.42
90 per    4.34  4.98  4.34 4.18 4.44 3.97 4.25  4.05 3.91
95 per    4.82  5.42  4.82 4.59 4.96 4.37 4.65  4.59 4.34
                                  
W O M E N                                   
N   386434  424     677720 1973     829817  5564
Mean   3.17  3.66  3.28 3.02 3.27 3.10 3.19  3.24 3.17
Var   0.90  1.39  0.86 0.83 1.02 0.75 0.74  0.88 0.67
                                  
5 per    1.82  2.18  2.01 1.66 1.91 1.85 1.95  1.88 2.00
10 per    2.23  2.41  2.38 1.99 2.17 2.11 2.27  2.27 2.29
25 per    2.64  2.92  2.74 2.42 2.58 2.51 2.66  2.66 2.66
50 per    3.14  3.50  3.25 2.94 3.12 3.01 3.12  3.13 3.09
75 per    3.72  4.42  3.79 3.61 3.86 3.63 3.71  3.77 3.67
90 per    4.21  5.05  4.28 4.20 4.52 4.22 4.30  4.52 4.23
95 per    4.64  5.67  4.68 4.52 4.93 4.52 4.64  5.00 4.59
Notes: N corresponds to individuals with valid hourly wages each year. The sample is restricted to individuals who are 20-59 years old. S 
and RM represent columns for the observed wage distributions of nonmigrants and migrants, respectively. CF is the counterfactual 
distribution of the wages that the return migrants would have earned had they been paid as nonmigrants. The counterfactual reweighting 
procedure uses the full population of nonmigrants and return migrants. To estimate the reweighting factor, we use the following 
variables: i) eight groups of age; ii) regional dummies for North, Mexico City, NL rural, high-migration rural, low-migration rural, 
intermediate-migration rural and north rural; iii) dummies for each of the following levels of education: no education, primary 











Table 5. Wage differences. Men and Women 1990-2010. 
Men Women 
    1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010
Mean    0.058 -0.051 -0.134 0.108 0.076 -0.017
   [0.005]  [0.003] [0.002] [0.009] [0.007] [0.006]
Var   -0.051  -0.142 -0.143 -0.038 -0.084 -0.068
   [0.005]  [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004]
                      
5  per    0.152 0.105 0.000 0.194 0.186 0.049
   [0.023]  [0.000] [0.005] [0.016] [0.010] [0.006]
10  per    0.116 0.041 -0.041 0.151 0.118 0.017
   [0.013]  [0.002] [0.000] [0.007] [0.006] [0.011]
25  per    0.097 0.028 -0.049 0.107 0.097 0.009
   [0.006]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.008] [0.010] [0.006]
50  per    0.023 -0.049 -0.126 0.110 0.067 -0.031
   [0.012]  [0.003] [0.007] [0.008] [0.014] [0.010]
75  per    0.036 -0.145 -0.187 0.072 0.017 -0.037
   [0.010]  [0.007] [0.003] [0.005] [0.016] [0.013]
90  per    0.004 -0.219 -0.342 0.069 0.013 -0.069
   [0.013]  [0.009] [0.016] [0.012] [0.012] [0.008]
95  per    0.000 -0.223 -0.310 0.041 0.000 -0.049
   [0.008]  [0.011] [0.008] [0.019] [0.008] [0.006]
Notes: For each statistic, the table shows the difference between the log hourly wages of the nonmigrants and the log hourly wages of the 
return migrants’ counterfactual distribution in Table 4. We calculate the standard errors by using bootstrap with 250 repetitions. The standard 




















Table 6. Return migrants and non-migrants paid as non-migrants in 2010. 
1990 2000 2010 
    S RM  DIF  S RM  DIF  S RM  DIF 
M E N                                   
Mean    3.02 3.07  0.046 3.11 3.06 -0.050 3.20 3.06  -0.134
           [ 0 . 0 0 5 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 2 ]       [ 0 . 0 0 2 ]
Var    0.57 0.48  -0.086 0.6 0.49 -0.118 0.65 0.51  -0.143
           [ 0 . 0 0 5 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 3 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 3 ]
                                  
5  per    1.97 2.11  0.134 2.04 2.11 0.069 2.11 2.11  0.000
           [ 0 . 0 0 6 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 2 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 5 ]
10  per    2.26 2.33  0.071 2.29 2.33 0.041 2.33 2.29  -0.041
           [ 0 . 0 0 9 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 0 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 0 ]
25  per    2.58 2.66  0.089 2.64 2.66 0.021 2.69 2.64  -0.049
           [ 0 . 0 0 0 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 2 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 0 ]
50  per    2.98 2.98  0.000 3.02 2.98 -0.041 3.11 2.98  -0.126
           [ 0 . 0 0 9 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 1 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 7 ]
75  per    3.39 3.39  0.000 3.49 3.39 -0.105 3.61 3.42  -0.187
           [ 0 . 0 0 5 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 2 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 3 ]
90  per    3.93 3.90  -0.036 4.12 3.9 -0.219 4.25 3.91  -0.342
         [0.006]       [0.008]       [0.016]
95  per    4.40 4.34  -0.065 4.52 4.3 -0.219 4.65 4.34  -0.310
           [ 0 . 0 1 8 ]         [ 0 . 0 1 1 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 8 ]
                                  
W O M E N                                   
Mean    2.93 3.05  0.122 3.07 3.12 0.048 3.19 3.17  -0.017
         [ 0 . 0 0 8 ]        [ 0 . 0 0 5 ]       [ 0 . 0 0 6 ]
Var    0.64 0.59  -0.053 0.69 0.63 -0.058 0.74 0.67  -0.068
           [0.007]       [0.004]       [0.004]
                                  
5  per    1.75 1.95  0.204 1.87 2 0.129 1.95 2.00  0.049
           [ 0 . 0 1 3 ]         [ 0 . 0 1 1 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 6 ]
10  per    2.10 2.29  0.183 2.18 2.29 0.111 2.27 2.29  0.017
           [ 0 . 0 1 0 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 6 ]        [ 0 . 0 1 1 ]
25  per    2.49 2.60  0.108 2.58 2.64 0.069 2.66 2.66  0.009
         [ 0 . 0 1 1 ]        [ 0 . 0 0 5 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 6 ]
50  per    2.85 2.97  0.123 2.98 3.02 0.041 3.12 3.09  -0.031
           [ 0 . 0 1 2 ]        [ 0 . 0 0 2 ]         [ 0 . 0 1 0 ]
75  per    3.34 3.43  0.090 3.54 3.56 0.020 3.71 3.67  -0.037
          [ 0 . 0 1 8 ]         [ 0 . 0 1 4 ]         [ 0 . 0 1 3 ]
90  per    3.90 4.05  0.153 4.16 4.18 0.020 4.30 4.23  -0.069
           [ 0 . 0 1 5 ]        [ 0 . 0 1 1 ]        [ 0 . 0 0 8 ]
95  per    4.34 4.44  0.092 4.52 4.52 0.000 4.64 4.59  -0.049
           [ 0 . 0 2 0 ]         [ 0 . 0 0 0 ]        [ 0 . 0 0 6 ]
Notes: The sample is restricted to individuals who are 20-59 years old. S and RM represent columns for the observed wage distributions 
of nonmigrants and migrants, respectively. CF is the counterfactual distribution of the wages that the return migrants would have earned 
had they been paid as nonmigrants. The counterfactual reweighting procedure uses the full population of nonmigrants and return 





Table 7. Wage distributions for subgroups. Men. 
1990 2000  2010 
    S    RM CF  S  RM CF  S  RM  CF 
R U R A L                                   
N   255636 597      421374 5842     563870  23748
Mean   2.55 3.11  2.76 2.48 2.79 2.65 2.81  2.92 2.85
10 per    1.17 1.71  1.49 1.62 2.07 1.89 2.06  2.24 2.15
50 per    2.59 3.10  2.81 2.42 2.76 2.58 2.80  2.86 2.80
90 per    3.75 4.53  3.87 3.43 3.68 3.45 3.67  3.71 3.61
                                  
U R B A N                                   
N   939043 2062      1055812 9253     1036116  24923
Mean   3.26 3.65  3.31 3.13 3.28 3.09 3.27  3.20 3.17
10 per    2.34 2.56  2.41 2.19 2.31 2.26 2.41  2.39 2.39
50 per    3.21 3.51  3.26 2.98 3.09 2.98 3.20  3.09 3.09
90 per    4.44 5.05  4.46 4.30 4.59 4.12 4.34  4.05 4.05
                                  
H I G H                                   
N   232892 1209      284071 6944     318680  17362
Mean   3.15 3.30  3.07 3.06 3.03 2.93 3.24  3.07 3.07
10 per    2.18 2.29  2.13 2.21 2.24 2.16 2.44  2.38 2.37
50 per    3.10 3.25  3.08 2.96 2.90 2.83 3.13  2.98 3.02
90 per    4.34 4.59  4.20 4.15 4.03 3.83 4.23  3.90 3.87
                                  
O T H E R                                   
N   961787 1450      1193115 8151     1281306  31309
Mean   3.10 3.72  3.27 3.01 3.24 3.00 3.19  3.13 3.06
10 per    2.07 2.56  2.32 2.04 2.22 2.07 2.29  2.29 2.29
50 per    3.07 3.61  3.24 2.92 3.03 2.92 3.09  3.02 2.98
90 per    4.34 5.15  4.47 4.19 4.66 4.08 4.25  4.12 3.96
Notes: The sample is restricted to male individuals who are 20-59 years old. S and RM represent columns for the observed wage 
distributions of nonmigrants and migrants, respectively. CF is the counterfactual distribution of the wages that the return migrants would 












Table 8. Robustness tests in counterfactual distribution for return migrants. 
1990 2000 2010 
    OR REST ALL OR REST ALL OR REST ALL 
M E N                                   
Mean    3.17 3.19  3.18 2.97 2.98 2.97 3.06 3.06  3.06
Var    1.05 1.04  1.06 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.51 0.51  0.51
                                  
5  per    1.56 1.64  1.57 1.89 1.89 1.89 2.11 2.08  2.10
10  per    2.21 2.23  2.22 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.29 2.29  2.29
25  per    2.66 2.69  2.67 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.64 2.64  2.64
50  per    3.12 3.16  3.14 2.87 2.89 2.87 2.98 2.98  2.98
75  per    3.69 3.72  3.72 3.35 3.39 3.35 3.42 3.42  3.41
90  per    4.34 4.35  4.36 3.97 4.01 3.99 3.91 3.91  3.90
95  per    4.82 4.84  4.86 4.37 4.42 4.41 4.34 4.34  4.32
                                  
W O M E N                                   
Mean    3.28 3.26  3.29 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.17 3.16  3.17
Var    0.86 0.91  0.88 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.67 0.67  0.67
                                  
5  per    2.01 1.93  2.00 1.85 1.86 1.86 2.00 1.99  2.00
10  per    2.38 2.34  2.37 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.29 2.29  2.29
25  per    2.74 2.72  2.76 2.52 2.54 2.53 2.66 2.66  2.66
50  per    3.25 3.25  3.28 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.09 3.05  3.08
75  per    3.79 3.79  3.82 3.63 3.65 3.68 3.67 3.65  3.67
90  per    4.28 4.31  4.31 4.22 4.25 4.26 4.23 4.23  4.23
95  per    4.68 4.71  4.71 4.52 4.55 4.55 4.59 4.59  4.59
Notes: OR represents the counterfactual estimates for return migrants in Table 4. RES follows the same procedure except that restricts the 
reweighting procedure to individuals with valid hourly wage. In ALL we include more variables when we estimate the reweighting factor 
in the full sample: interactions between years of schooling and each of the six geographical areas, interactions between the years of 
schooling and each of the age groups, interactions between the age and the six geographical areas, and interactions between the rural 














Table 9. Robustness test: Men 20-34. 
1990 2000  2010 
    S RM  CF S  RM  CF S  RM  CF 
N   656020  1698      770578 10039     747004  28845
Mean   3.08  3.46  3.12 2.94 3.09 2.91 3.10  3.05 3.00
10 per    2.17  2.41  2.23 2.07 2.22 2.11 2.33  2.33 2.29
50 per    3.06  3.40  3.10 2.86 2.92 2.82 3.02  2.98 2.96
90 per    4.21  4.81  4.21 3.96 4.25 3.83 4.04  3.90 3.78
Notes: The sample is restricted to male individuals who are 20-34 years old. S and RM represent columns for the observed wage 
distributions of nonmigrants and migrants, respectively. CF is the counterfactual distribution of the wages that the return migrants would 
have earned had they been paid as nonmigrants. The counterfactual reweighting procedure uses the male population of nonmigrants and 
return migrants who are 20-34 years old. 
 
 
Table 10. Robustness test: Different datasets. 
ENADID EMS  ENOE 
    S  RM CF  S  RM CF  S  RM  CF 
M A L E                                   
N   23231  415      3767 585     221648  1048 
Mean   2.97  3.04  2.93 2.66 2.70 2.63 -0.25  -0.56  -0.44
Var   0.62  0.80  0.52 0.69 0.59 0.59 0.59  0.51  0.51
10 per    2.09  2.15  2.12 1.60 1.73 1.68 -1.04  -1.32  -1.17
50 per    2.89  3.00  2.87 2.71 2.66 2.64 -0.29  -0.54  -0.43
90 per    3.98  4.14  3.83 3.63 3.69 3.52 0.70  0.22  0.33
Notes: ENADID: National Survey of Demographic Dynamics, conducted in 2006. EMS: Social Mobility Survey, conducted in 2006. 
ENOE: National Survey of Employment and Occupation. We use the surveys from the third quarter of 2005 to the second quarter of 
2007. We restrict the sample to men between 20 and 59 years old, except in the given EMS for which data were only available for men 
between 25 and 59 years old. S and RM represent the columns for the observed wage distributions of the nonmigrants and the migrants, 
respectively. CF is the counterfactual distribution of the wages that the return migrants would have earned had they been paid as 
nonmigrants. The counterfactual reweighting procedure uses the male population of the nonmigrants and the return migrants. The 
variables used to calculate the reweighting factor are the same as those in Table 4, except in the case of ENOE in which the indigenous 
















Figure 1. 1990 men. 
  
a)  Observed   b)  Counterfactual 
c)  Difference in Observed  d)  Difference in Counterfactual 
 
Notes: The sample is restricted to male individuals between 20 and 59 years old. Panel a plots the observed wage distributions; Panel b 
plots the counterfactual distribution of wages that the return migrants would have earned had they never migrated; Panel c plots the 
difference in the observed wage distributions; and Panel d plots the difference between the counterfactual distribution and the observed 
distribution of the nonmigrants. All nonparametric distributions use the Epanechnikov kernel. The counterfactual reweights the 


























Figure 2. 1990 women. 
  
a)  Observed   b)  Counterfactual 
c)  Difference in Observed  d)  Difference in Counterfactual 
Notes: The sample is restricted to female individuals between 20 and 59 years old. Panel a plots the observed wage distributions; Panel b 
plots the counterfactual distribution of wages that the return migrants would have earned had they never migrated; Panel c plots the 
difference in the observed wage distributions; and Panel d plots the difference between the counterfactual distribution and the observed 
distribution of the nonmigrants. All nonparametric distributions use the Epanechnikov kernel. The counterfactual reweights the 




















Figure 3. 2000 men. 
  
a)  Observed   b)  Counterfactual 
c)  Difference in Observed  d)  Difference in Counterfactual 
Notes: The sample is restricted to male individuals between 20 and 59 years old. Panel a plots the observed wage distributions; Panel b 
plots the counterfactual distribution of wages that the return migrants would have earned had they never migrated; Panel c plots the 
difference in the observed wage distributions; and Panel d plots the difference between the counterfactual distribution and the observed 
distribution of the nonmigrants. All nonparametric distributions use the Epanechnikov kernel. The counterfactual reweights the 





















Figure 4. 2000 women. 
  
a)  Observed   b)  Counterfactual 
c)  Difference in Observed  d)  Difference in Counterfactual 
Notes: The sample is restricted to female individuals between 20 and 59 years old. Panel a plots the observed wage distributions; Panel b 
plots the counterfactual distribution of wages that the return migrants would have earned had they never migrated; Panel c plots the 
difference in the observed wage distributions; and Panel d plots the difference between the counterfactual distribution and the observed 
distribution of the nonmigrants. All nonparametric distributions use the Epanechnikov kernel. The counterfactual reweights the 


















Figure 5. 2010 men. 
  
a)  Observed   b)  Counterfactual 
c)  Difference in Observed  d)  Difference in Counterfactual 
Notes: The sample is restricted to male individuals between 20 and 59 years old. Panel a plots the observed wage distributions; Panel b 
plots the counterfactual distribution of wages that the return migrants would have earned had they never migrated; Panel c plots the 
difference in the observed wage distributions; and Panel d plots the difference between the counterfactual distribution and the observed 
distribution of the nonmigrants. All nonparametric distributions use the Epanechnikov kernel. The counterfactual reweights the 
























Figure 6. 2010 women 
  
a)  Observed   b)  Counterfactual 
c)  Difference in Observed  d)  Difference in Counterfactual 
Notes: The sample is restricted to female individuals between 20 and 59 years old. Panel a plots the observed wage distributions; Panel b 
plots the counterfactual distribution of wages that the return migrants would have earned had they never migrated; Panel c plots the 
difference in the observed wage distributions; and Panel d plots the difference between the counterfactual distribution and the observed 
distribution of the nonmigrants. All nonparametric distributions use the Epanechnikov kernel. The counterfactual reweights the 























Figure 7. Men 




Notes: The sample is restricted to male individuals between 20 and 59 years old. All nonparametric distributions use the Epanechnikov 
kernel. The counterfactual reweights the non-migrants wage distribution fixing the wage structure of non-migrants to the 2010 level with 



















Figure 8. Women 




Notes: The sample is restricted to female individuals between 20 and 59 years old. All nonparametric distributions use the Epanechnikov 
kernel. The counterfactual reweights the non-migrants wage distribution fixing the wage structure of non-migrants to the 2010 level with 
the characteristics of return migrants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 